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Abstract
This paper studies patterns of technological change under two scenarios.
In Scenario I, a distorted government is open to the inuence of produc-
erscollective action, while in Scenario II a benevolent government operates
to maximize national income. The paper draws attention to the role that
institutional arrangements and asymmetries in sectoral technology absorp-
tion play in shaping the path of technological change. Simulation results
are threefold. First, biased institutions under Scenario I might help drag
the economy towards the right trajectory, with current generations experi-
encing welfare loss. Secondly, the benevolent government under Scenario II
supports the path of capital-augmenting technological change, which is also
supported by the distorted government only when institutions deliberately
favor the investment goods producing sector. Thirdly, sectoral asymmetries
in technology assimilation do not help industries overcome disadvantageous
situations in the political market, and hence do not inuence the direction
of technological developments.
                             
JEL Codes: O33 - Technological change: Choices and Consequences,
O38 - Government Policy, P26 - Political Economy
Keywords: Technological change, industrial policy and lobbying, and
political-economic equilibrium.
1. Introduction12
The comforting belief that technological change is neutral has come under attack
in the recent past. Although the evidence is by no means uniform, there appears to
be su¢ cient of it to show that public R&D investments induce factor-saving tech-
nical changes [Griliches (1979), Gorter and Zilberman (1985), Pardey and Craig
(1989), Justman and Teubal (1986, 1991), Coe and Helpman (1993), Mamuneas
(1993), Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994a, 1994b)]. This obviously suggests a role
for public intervention in subsidizing R&D activities, and in fact, as it turns out,
government intervention has been quite marked throughout the developed world.
Governments share of total R&D spending is currently about 50 percent in the
US and France, 33 percent in Germany, and 20 percent in Japan [see Aghion and
Howitt (1998), p.485]. R&D subsidies, as expected, have been heavily criticized
in various countries for being wasteful and unnecessary, and are also subject to
political lobbying in a context of widespread informational asymmetries between
government agencies and entrepreneurs.
The uncomfortable evidence, that technical changes are, in part, endogenous
to government policies and, therefore, likely to be non-neutral in their e¤ects on
the direction of technological developments, has drawn signicant attention in the
literature on technology and growth [see Fuhrer and Little (1996) for an extensive
survey of studies]. The most recent line of research has focused on the role of
factors such as human capital and R&D investments in the process of growth
[Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988), Murphy et al. (1989), Grossman and Helpman
(1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)]. The models of endogenous growth in
this regard have stressed learning and purposive R&D activities as driving forces
of growth through the creation of new products and the improvement in the
quality of existing ones. Unlike in the neoclassical models of the Solow-type, long-
run growth rates in these models are not pinned down by a forever diminishing
marginal productivity of capital, and can be a¤ected by government policies. A
second approach has made heavy use of search concepts to characterize the process
of invention and attempted to model the distribution of potential inventions as
an uncertain outcome of a sequence of research experiments [Nordhaus (1969),
1The rst author is a¢ liated with Development Research Institute (IVO) at Tilburg Univer-
sity in The Netherlands; The second author is with the Department of Applied Economics at
the University of Minnesota in the USA.
2The authors would like to thank Michiel A. Keyzer, Vernon W. Ruttan, and Xinshen Diao
for their comments on the earlier version of this paper.
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Evenson and Kislev (1976), Binswanger and Ruttan (1978)]. Remaining within the
connes of the search framework, the models of induced innovation have concerned
with the determinants of the direction of search. These models investigate whether
the search is for more labor-intensive or for more capital-intensive techniques,
and hypothesize that expected factor prices a¤ect the direction of search activity
[Binswanger and Ruttan (1978)]. The determination of the factors that a¤ect the
spread of innovations across rms engaging in similar activities has been the main
concern of so called di¤usion models. Focusing on the evolution and adoption of
a well-specied technology, these models assume that the probability of adopting
an innovation depends on the proportion of the rms in the industry that have
already adopted the innovation, on the benets from adopting it, and on the
costs of its adoption. Various applications of these models signify that adoption
decisions are mainly economically motivated [Griliches (1957), Manseld (1961)].
Inspired from the observation that a large residual in per capita output growth
cannot be attributed to the growth of per capita capital service ows, growth
accounting methods have concentrated on the sources of this large residual [Solow
(1957)]. Research has directly focused on the variables that determine input and
output qualities as well as contribute to the residual, like public and private R&D,
schooling, infrastructure, and the policy regime [Griliches (1957, 1963), Denison
(1962)]. The last, but not the least, line of research has attempted to establish the
basic rational for intellectual property rights and focused on the role that existing
property rights, patents, and incentives to engage in R&D play in inventions
[Arrow (1962), Nordhaus (1969), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Dasgupta (1986)].
It is to our surprise that, although emphasizing the importance of government
policies at every chance they have, studies in the literature have paid almost
no attention to the fact that these policies are open to the inuence of interest-
groups3. This is precisely what we attempt to model in the present study by
bringing together the main elements of induced innovation, growth accounting,
and rent-seeking approaches. From the rent-seeking theory we adopt the idea that
policy decision regarding the allocation of public resources is intrinsically open to
the inuence of interest groups. From the induced innovation approach, we further
borrow the idea that expected factor prices play the key role in inuencing the
direction of search for production techniques that save the most scarce factor.
Getting factor prices right is important not only for choice of technique but for
3Two exceptions to this are studies by Binswanger and Ruttan (1978) and Hayami and
Ruttan (1985), though they did not treat the matter with the rigor that we have in the present
study.
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design of incentives to a¤ect the direction of search activity as well. Finally, we
borrow from growth accounting approach that enhancing the quality of inputs
would, in part, account for the variation in total factor productivity. Publicly
provided R&D might be considered one of those factors that would improve the
quality of private inputs, capital and labor.
Taking together these three approaches, we consider the direction of techno-
logical change to be endogenous to producerscollective action for public R&D
that induces factor-augmenting technical changes. This view nds its most appar-
ent expression in the context of industrial policy that is implemented, in slightly
di¤erent forms, throughout the developed world. The supporting argument for an
industrial policy is that future economic growth is strongly linked to the soundness
of strategically vital industries. It has recently been observed that these indus-
tries in various countries started exerting pressure on government for economic
assistance in the provision of R&D subsidies. Such assistance, however, has often
been criticized for being arbitrary and discretionary in the choice of beneciaries,
because it is the government rather than a properly functioning market that de-
cides who will receive funding. This means that there is always room for genuine
mistakes on the governments part, as well as incentives on the rms part to
waste resources lobbying for lucrative contracts. The problem grows more critical
compared with other branches of government decision making for several reasons.
First, knowledge externalities are particularly hard to identify and measure ad-
equately, as are the various market imperfections that motivate intervention in
the R&D sector. Second, picking winners is always hazardous, especially in the
R&D sector whose activities are often unpredictable. Third, there are severe in-
formational asymmetries between the government and potential beneciaries with
respect to the impact of R&D investments [see Krugman (1983), Norton (1986),
Magee, Brock, and Young (1989), Aghion and Howitt (1998) for a survey of studies
on industrial policy].
In this study the above argument is modeled in a framework in which dis-
torted and undistorted governments can be compared with respect to the implied
paths of technological change. Such comparison would also allow, though not
falling within the scope of the current study, for an approximate measure of wel-
fare loss. A distorted government is assumed to operate with a predetermined
policy decision rule for the distribution of R&D subsidies, while an undistorted
government achieves the distribution via the maximization of total income. Pro-
ducers signal their willingness to pay for R&D subsidies via political lobbying;
and thereafter, winners are picked and their shares of subsidies are determined by
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using the policy decision rule [see Lin and Nugent (1995) for an extensive survey
of studies on the role of collective action in policy formation, De Janvry, Sadoulet,
and Fafchamps (1989), Li (1993), Alston, Chalfant, and Pardey (1993), Hayami
and Ruttan (1985)]. The theory of rent-seeking behavior has advanced in many
directions since the pioneering contributions by Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974),
and Posner (1975). Perhaps because of the early preoccupation with the social
costs of monopoly, the literature has tended to emphasize contests in which the
winner takes all[Tullock (1980, 1984), Corcoran (1984), and Hillman and Katz
(1984)]. This approach is appropriate when agents compete for a monopoly rent,
a contract or any other indivisible transfer. On the contrary, producers in the
current study expand resources competing for a share of a divisible rather than
for the whole of an indivisible rent, like lobbying by factor owners for a share of
national product and by intermediate and nal goods producers in an industry
for/against protection of intermediate goods.
An overlapping generations (OLG) framework has been adopted as it provides
an appropriate demographic structure to analyze situations where lobbying has
consequences that outlive generations. This framework facilitates analysis of in-
tergenerational externalities which are intrinsically hard to internalize because
those who impose the externalities are not alive at the same time as those who
enjoy or su¤er the consequences. One such externality that arises in the con-
text of the lobbying economy model is that collective action today determines
the nature of technological change that will arise tomorrow. And hence future
generations are bound to act on it. Although intergenerational issues have been
extensively discussed in the literature of exhaustible resources [see, for example,
Solow (1974, 1986)], the very same issues are almost absent in models of collective
action, except for Sandler (1982). Despite the advantages of the OLG framework,
one should also recognize the complications introduced by it. First, analysis of
Pareto-improving policies becomes demanding since it requires an ordering of the
welfare of innitely many generations. Second, competitive equilibrium can be
dynamically ine¢ cient: in which case all generations would benet if they accu-
mulated less capital and increased their consumption. Our study also attempts to
investigate optimal policies with respect to the direction of technological advances
and the conditions under which dynamic ine¢ ciency is likely to arise.
A central claim of this paper is that technological change and its direction
are endogenous to the workings of producerscollective action. The rational for
producers to lobby is that they can reduce the cost of production by changing the
direction in their favor.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the lobbying
economy model and dene important concepts often encountered in the paper. We
further explain the roles of and interactions between agents in the model economy.
For simplicity and readability, mathematical formulations of agentsmaximization
problems are all given in Appendix. After that, we illustrate the key properties
of the model economy using a numerical example. The nal section concludes.
2. Description of a lobbying economy model4
Producers. The model economy consists of two sectors, each of which produces at
time t a perishable consumption good Y 1t and an investment good Y
2
t , using the
production technology of the form:
Y it = (1 Rit)Eit 1[i(Ai(Git)Kit)
i
+ (1  i)(Di(Git)Lit)
i
]
i
i  (1 Rit)Y
i
t (2.1)
The labor-intensive and a capital-intensive technologies are employed in the pro-
duction of consumption and of investment goods, respectively. A representative
rm in sector i employs three inputs: capital Kit , labor L
i
t, and public input G
i
t.
The third input enters the production function in the form of factor-augmenting
research and development (R&D) investments and enhances the productivity of
other inputs. This feature is incorporated into the production technology via the
terms, Ai(Git) = e
iGit and Di(Git) = e
(1 i)Git, where idenotes the rate of capital
augmentation (1 < 2 < 1). The production technologies are assumed to ex-
hibit decreasing returns (i.e., 0 < i < 1) with respect to (Kit ; L
i
t) given G
i
t. The
two sectors are distinguished by the type of public R&D they wish to have: The
labor-intensive (capital-intensive) sector wishes to obtain the labor-augmenting
(capital-augmenting) type. The parameter values (0 < 1 < 2 < 1) reect that
the consumption (investment) good producing sector is labor (capital) intensive.
And i determines the elasticity of substitution between Kit and L
i
t.
Technology absorption. In the production technology (2.1), two stocks of re-
sources are distinguished: production capacity and technological capacity. The
former incorporates the resources used to produce goods at given levels of e¢ ciency
and given input combinations. Technological capability, however, incorporates the
additional and distinct resources needed to generate and manage technical change,
4For presentational simplicity, agentsmaximization problems and rst order conditions are
all provided in Appendix. Here we only focus on the description of the main concepts utilized
in the model economy.
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including skills, knowledge and experience, and institutional structures. Technol-
ogy absorption is said to occur when sectors, through their research e¢ ciency or
e¢ cient managerial structures, are able to exploit the past technologies to create
new ones. Pharmaceutical industries, in which new medicines are quite often the
mix of already existing medicines, and machine industries are those industries
where such assimilation takes place at a rather high rate.
Technology absorption is represented in this study by the term, Eit 1  eiGt 1 ,
where Gt 1, predetermined at time t  1, denotes the stock of public R&D inher-
ited from the last period. This inherited resource is assumed to improve the
productive e¢ ciency of all factors neutrally, however, sectorsawareness of this is
limited and varies across sectors5. This brings about asymmetries regarding sec-
torscapabilities of technology assimilation [see Pavitt (1984), Malerba (1992) for
evidence on sectoral patterns of technical change]. The parameter i represents
sector is technology absorption capability, and asymmetries are reected by the
parameter specication: 1 > 2 or 2 > 1.
An important implication of technology assimilation is that the sector with
higher capability of absorption would be less interested in lobbying activities be-
cause that sector would choose to augment its output by exploiting the existing
stock of public R&D. This is the situation in which free riding problem is likely to
emerge. Nonetheless, the very same sector would still incur a cost of not lobbying
enough via increased price of factor that is intensively used in the production.
Such a trade-o¤ implies that in equilibrium sector is marginal cost of not lobby-
ing (in terms of increased factor prices) should be equal to marginal benet from
technology absorption.
Distorted government. We introduce a distorted government: One that only
carries out the outcome of lobbying, and that does not represent any political
interest group. It is nothing but an intermediary agent that translates producers
lobbying activities into inuence. It uses a predetermined policy decision rule,
which is not subject to any change over time. Such a government structure has
been adopted for two reasons. First, this allows one to eliminate the bias in-
troduced by the government behavior to the direction of technological change.
Second, it is often the case that perverse policy responses are a logical outcome
of the conicts between interest groups [de Janvry and Sadoulet (1988)]. A neu-
tral role attributed to the government is the main distinguishing feature of our
5Of course, sectors which are aware of positive externalities might invest in factors likely to
enhance their capability to internilize the externalities. This will endogenize i, however, this is
beyond the scope of the current study.
7
approach from the other approaches adopted in the models of rent-seeking the-
ory. In these models, a usual type of government operates as a third agent with
specic preferences such as revenue-maximizing or political support-maximizing
[Hillman and Ursprung (1988), Potters and Van Winden (1992), Downs (1957),
Magee, Brock, and Young (1989), Grindle and Thomas (1991)]. A nal remark
on the behavior of the distorted government is that it follows a balanced budget
policy and nances the production of public R&D via labor and capital income
taxes from the young and old generations, respectively.
Endogenous policy via collective action. The government in o¢ ce is assumed
to be distorted and its policy as regards to the sectoral distribution of public
R&D characterized by three institutional rules: (i) producers, knowing that the
government accepts any outcome of lobbying, inuence its policy decision via lob-
bying, (ii) the government considers the impact of the existing institutions (i)
on its policy decision, and (iii) relative lobbying governs the sectoral distribu-
tion. Remaining along the same line with studies in the rent-seeking literature,
the present study introduces pressure and inuence functions to describe how
political pressure is translated into the distributional weights [Becker (1983), Tul-
lock (1980)]. It is simply assumed that pressure Bit, B
i
t = 
iRitY
i
t, is produced by
spending resources RitY
i
t, and that an inuence function of the form I
i
t = (
BitP2
i=1B
i
t
)
subsequently translates pressure into the distributional weights I it . The inuence
function, which is concave in Rit, implies that (i) the higher the lobbying by sector
i, the higher is its e¤ectiveness, (ii) its inuence starts weakening after a certain
level of lobbying expenditures. For the sectoral share of R&D to be determined,
the government uses a policy decision rule6, Git = I
i
tGt, reecting the institutional
setting within which lobbying takes place. Endogenous policy in this context is
nothing more that endogenizing the distributional weights.
The lobbying process introduced in this study works as follows. Represented
by a lobby group, each sector confronts the policy decision rule which is announced
by the government in the beginning of time t. Thereafter, given i for i = 1; 2,
lobbyists in sector i extend resources to inuence the policy, Git. Finally, the
government makes public input available to the sectors in such a way that it
6As seen from the inuence function, indeterminacy occurs with respect to the distribu-
tional weights if both sectors simultaneously choose the strategy of no-lobbying. Such in-
determinacy could have been avoided by specifying an alternative form of inuence function,
Git = (
1
1+e(B
2
t B1t )
)Gt for i = 1; 2 [Hirshleifer (1989)]. The goal of the present study is merely to
focus on the path of lobbying-driven technological change, therefore the strategy of simultane-
ously no-lobbyingis discarded.
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cannot incur a scal policy.
Consumers. The model economy consists of overlapping generations of two-
period-lived consumers, and each generation is assumed to comprise only a single
individual. In the rst period, an individual born at time t  1 supplies her
unit endowment of labor inelastically, earns labor income and pays taxes, receives
prot share, and makes savings for the next period consumption. In the second
period, she retires and earns income from savings, pays capital income tax. An
initial old person alive at time t = 1 spends her income on the second period
consumption. The model assumes perfect foresight, E(pt+1) = pt+1 where pt+1 is
the relative price of output at time t+ 1; and that the gross return to savings (or
return to capital at time (t + 1)) (1 + it+1) is known at time t by borrowers and
lenders. The initial labor and capital endowments (L0; K0) > 0 are exogenously
given at t = 0, and economy-wide labor force is constant at Lt = L = 1 8t.
Consumers receive prot income and realize that they have no control over
prices. They act as producers maximizing prots when at work, and act as indi-
viduals maximizing utility when at home. And these objectives at di¤erent times
of the day do not contradict the fact that the government is of a distorted type,
setting policy under the inuence of lobbyists.
Lobbying works its way through to consumers via changes in output and input
prices. First, lobbying inuences the supply of R&D that enhances the produc-
tivity of capital and labor. Second, it pulls resources away from the productive
activities and a¤ects the scale of production. The rst e¤ect creates changes in
factor prices as the second causes changes in the relative price of output. These
e¤ects make their presence known through changes in consumer demand for con-
sumption and investment goods as well as changes in the supply of factors that
they own.
Undistorted government. Maximizing gross national product, Yt = ptY 1t +
Y 2t , the undistorted government is assumed to think of all agents well being
without any prejudice against/for any agent. The resource allocation suggested
by such government is called optimal. With the introduction of the undistorted
government, one can measure output loss from engaging in lobbying activities
and give a view of how far away agents are from the optimal allocation. Another
advantage is that it enables us to compare the optimal path with the lobbying-
driven path of technological change. In the present model, technological change
is said to occur whenever factor-augmenting R&D is made available to producers.
A path is called optimal (lobbying-driven) if it is suggested by the undistorted
(distorted) government. Furthermore, a path is called an optimal capital (labor)
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augmenting path if the undistorted government favors the production of R&D
that augments capital (labor); likewise, a path is a lobbying-driven capital (labor)
augmenting path if the distorted government happens to favor the production of
capital (labor) augmenting R&D.
Evolution of capital stock. An important feature of the lobbying model is
that the capital stock at time t + 1 is assumed to be equal to the output of the
investment good produced at time t,
Kt+1 = (1  s2t )Y
2
(K2t ; L
2
t ; G
2(s1t ; s
2
t )). (2.2)
This equation clearly indicates that the entire path of capital stock is determined
by sector 2s capital-labor use and lobbying e¤orts of producers in both sectors7.
In accordance with this path, gross national income is obtained from
Yt = pt(1  s1t )Y
1
(K1t ; L
1
t ; G
1(s1t ; s
2
t )) + (1  s2t )Y
2
(K2t ; L
2
t ; G
2(s1t ; s
2
t )). (2.3)
The unique steady-state level of capital follows from8
4Kt  (Kt+1  Kt) = (1  s2t )Y
2
(K2t ; L
2
t ; G
2(s1t ; s
2
t )) Kt = 0:
7For the stock of capital to grow, the following relation should hold for given (K2t ; L
2
t ; s
1
t ),
@Kt+1
@s2t
=  Y 2t +(1  s2t )@Y
2
t
@G2t
@G2t
@s2t
> 0 where @Y
2
t
@G2t
> 0 and @G
2
t
@s2t
> 0: This implies that a politically
strong capital-intensive sector is desirable for the economy to grow.
8Denote _K  @Kt@t = Kt+1 Ktt (t 1) . Assuming Lt = L for all t implies
_L = 0: (2.4)
The lobbying economy model assumes Kt+1 = Y 2t that can be re-written as
_K  Kt+1  Kt = Y 2t  Kt: (2.5)
Taking the total derivative of Kt = ktLt with respect to t results in
_K = kt _L+ _kLt: (2.6)
Now substituting (2.4 and 2.5) into (2.6) and solving the resulting equation for _k yileds
_k =
Y 2t
Lt
  kt  g(K2t ; L2t ; s2t ; s1t ; L; kt):
That _k = 0 has to be satised in equilibrium implies

1
Lt

Y 2t = kt:
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3. A numerical example
This numerical example serves as a qualitative illustration of the main features of
political-economic equilibrium (see Appendix for its denition). It envisages two
extremes. At one, sectors are assumed to have no ability of absorbing technology,
which is represented by Eit 1 = 1 (i.e., 
i = 0 8i). At the other extreme, asymmet-
ric absorption is assumed across sectors, which is represented by Eit 1 > 0 8i and
E1t 1 6= E2t 1 (i.e., i > 0 8i and 1 6= 2). Simulations are carried out to describe
the role of institutions and asymmetries in inuencing the direction of technolog-
ical change and welfare along with the implied direction. Numerical experiments
are also performed for the case in which the government is undistorted (6.29), and
the results from these experiments are then contrasted with those obtained from
political-economic equilibrium.
The set of the parameter values that have been commonly used in all exper-
iments is: f1 =  1
3

; 1 = 1 = 0:4; 1 = 2 = 0:8; 2 =  1; 2 = 2 = 0:6;
 = 0:95; 1:8  Kt  0:7; L = 1;  = 0:5g. To eliminate any bias in kit that
might be introduced by the distorted government we set  = 0:5 in (6.6). Some
of the other parameter values have been taken from studies in the literature. For
example, 1 =
 
1
3

and 2 =  1 were adopted from Uzawa (1962), Craven (1973),
and Fisher (1992) to guarantee the stability of the political-economic equilibrium;
the discount factor  = 0:95 from Parente and Prescott (1993). The rest of the
parameter values has been chosen in such a way that the lobbying economy model
satises that (i) production functions are concave with respect to the choice vari-
ables and (ii) reaction functions intersect only once.
3.1. Sectors are unable to absorb technology
Unbiased institutions (1 = 2). Under this specication of institutions, two
results are worth of elaborating. First, technological change follows the path in
which the distorted government increasingly supplies the labor-augmenting R&D.
This is an immediate result of capital that becomes abundant over time, in which
case raising wage-rental ratio induces producers of the labor-intensive good to
lobby for the labor-augmenting R&D. Responding to their political pressure, the
government makes the desired type of technology available using its policy decision
rule. On the other hand, producers of the capital-intensive good happily reduce
their lobbying e¤orts as increasing wage-rental ratio lowers the cost of production
in this sector. Second, welfare of the old (young) generation is expected to decline
(improve) along with the labor-augmenting path because declining rt = (1 Kt )rt
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would reduce the income of the old. Obviously, there are two sources of a welfare
loss on the part of the old generation. One is the imposition of heavy capital taxes
given the rental rate of capital, and the other is a decrease in the rental rate of
capital given a certain scal policy. But results from the numerical experiments
under alternative scal regimes suggest that heavy capital taxes, in fact, improve
the total welfare while making the old worse o¤. This situation would lead in the
long run to dynamic ine¢ ciency in which case all generations would save less and
increase their consumption.
Biased institutions (2 > 1). Under this specication, institutional struc-
ture favors the investment good producing sector, and as a result, the economy
augments capital at a higher rate than it does labor because biased institutions ex-
aggerate the inuence of lobbyists representing the capital-intensive sector. Con-
sequently, the capital-augmenting path emerges as the dominant path along which
the production of the investment good raises (i.e., @Y
2
t
@2
> 0). This is so called rst
round e¤ect of technology. The second round e¤ect takes place due to rising
relative price of output and to declining production of the consumption good as
labor-augmenting R&D becomes scarce (i.e., ( @pt
@2
Y 1t + pt
@Y 1t
@2
)  or < 0). Insti-
tutional bias will then be harmful for economic growth if the second round e¤ect
is negative and dominates the rst one; it will be benecial if the second round
e¤ect is positive9. In our model, there exists a political-economic equilibrium in
which bias results in shrinking gross income.
Optimal versus lobbying-driven path. Simulation results indicate that the
undistorted government favors the capital-augmenting path reected by G^1t < G^
2
t
that contradicts the path ~G1t > ~G
2
t implied by the political-economic equilibrium
with unbiased institutions10. It also appears that the distorted government is un-
able to correct this wrong direction with respect to technological developments
no matter what scal scheme it implements. To this end, one can reasonably
conclude that the direction of technological change is wrong and irreversible if in-
stitutions are neutral. Could institutional bias help drag the economy towards the
right direction? Results reveal that the path under biased institutions ~G1t < ~G
2
t
agrees with the optimal path, strongly supporting the signicant role that insti-
9Gross national product is dened as Yt = ptY 1t + Y
2
t . In equilibrium, Y
i
t = Y
i(1; 2; )
and pt = p(
1; 2; ), hence @Yt
@2
=
h
( @pt
@2
Y 1t + pt
@Y 1t
@2
) +
@Y 2t
@2
i
where @Yt
@2
< 0 if ( @pt
@2
Y 1t +
pt
@Y 1t
@2
) < 0 and j ( @pt
@2
Y 1t + pt
@Y 1t
@2
) j> @Yt
@2
:
10An overhead cap, x^, and an overhead tilde, ~x, indicate that the variable x applies to the
benevolent and passive government, respectively.
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tutional structure plays in characterizing the nature of technological change and
that biasedness helps eliminate ine¢ ciencies with respect to the type of tech-
nology supplied. A second result obtained from the comparison of optimal and
lobbying-driven paths is that lobbying leads to an excess supply of R&D, that is,
~Gt > G^t. This is because in the lobbying economy model producers determine,
without paying for it, the amount to be produced while consumers nance its
production through taxes.
3.2. Sectors asymmetrically absorb technology
This specication imposes asymmetries with respect to sectorsability to assim-
ilate the existing stock of R&D that has been inherited from the last period.
Such asymmetry is incorporated into the model by parameter values, f1 = 0:8
> 2 = 0:2 and 1 = 0:2 < 2 = 0:8g. The asymmetry of the type 1 > 2
corresponds to a situation in which the consumption good producing sector as-
similates technology more than does the investment good producing sector. The
rest of the parameters used in the simulations takes on the same values as in Sec-
tion (3.1). The direction of technological change is investigated under alternative
institutional structures.
Unbiased institutions. The maximal (minimal) amount of public R&D is pro-
duced under the regime that labor (capital) income is heavily taxed, and whatever
the type of asymmetries, the amount produced remains the same11. In general,
given a scal regime the total R&D production remains the same no matter which
sector is of more capable in assimilating the stock of technology. In the case of
sectoral R&D allocation, unbiased institutions support the type of R&D that aug-
ments labor. The maximum production of this type is again attained when the
government collects heavy labor income taxes12. Apparent that absorption asym-
metries do not change the course of technological advances, only thing that mat-
ters, of course to the extent that the lobbying model allows, is scal regime. This
has direct links with consumerswell-being through changing disposable income.
The young is more supportive to the technology reproduction by tax payments
than the old.
The simulation results draw an interesting picture with respect to the rela-
tionship between asymmetries and the relative output price. With the type of
11Gt(
L
t > 
K
t ; 
2 = 1) > Gt(
L
t = 
K
t ; 
2 = 1) > Gt(
L
t < 
K
t ; 
2 = 1):
12G1t (
L
t > 
K
t ; 
2 = 1) > G2t (
L
t > 
K
t ; 
2 = 1); G1t (
L
t = 
K
t ; 
2 = 1) > G2t (
L
t =
Kt ; 
2 = 1); and G1t (
L
t < 
K
t ; 
2 = 1) > G2t (
L
t < 
K
t ; 
2 = 1).
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asymmetry (1 > 2) in which the consumption good producing sector has a
higher absorption capability than does the other sector, the price reveals a cycli-
cal pattern: rising until capital and labor become equally abundant and declining
when capital is relatively abundant. While this cyclicality remains, price levels
show convergence across alternative scal policies. In the case of 2 > 1, the
price continuously increases at a decreasing rate, but interestingly reveal diver-
gence across scal regimes (see Figure 1). What is obvious in this comparison is
that asymmetries inject disturbances into output markets, inuencing only con-
sumerswelfare. Since these asymmetries do evoke proportional change in factor
demand, the wage-rental ratio remains unchanged.
Biased institutions. The maximal (minimal) amount of public R&D is pro-
duced under the regime that labor (capital) income is heavily taxed, and whatever
the type of asymmetries, the amount produced remains the same13. This means
that given a scal policy the total R&D production remains the same no matter
which sector is of more capable in assimilating the stock of technology. In the
case of sectoral R&D allocation, biased institutions support the type of R&D that
augments capital. The maximum production of this type is again attained when
the government collects heavy labor income taxes14. Parallel to the case of unbi-
ased institutions, scal policy is the driving force behind technology supply as the
role of asymmetries is nil. What is apparent in these results, when compared to
those from the scenario with unbiased institutions, is that relative position of the
young (the old) with respect to changes in its disposable income does not change
as the wage-rental ratios under both scenarios are equal.
We observe that cyclicality, convergence, and divergence of output price paths
still remain, strongly suggesting that this is a result of technological asymmetries.
Wage-rental ratios do not experience any change either, remaining equal across
asymmetries.
Comparison of biased and unbiased institutions. Four nal conclusions are
drawn. First, with respect to scal policy the government nds it more produc-
tive to impose heavy labor income taxes independently from institutional struc-
ture. Second, the total production of R&D remains the same under alternative
institutional structures15, which implies that the governments demand for capi-
13Gt(
L
t > 
K
t ; 
2 > 1) > Gt(
L
t = 
K
t ; 
2 > 1) > Gt(
L
t < 
K
t ; 
2 > 1).
14G2t (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K
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1) > G1t (
L
t > 
K
t ; 
2 > 1); G2t (
L
t = 
K
t ; 
2 > 1) > G1t (
L
t =
Kt ; 
2 > 1); G2t (
L
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K
t ; 
2 > 1) > G1t (
L
t < 
K
t ; 
2 > 1).
15Gt(
L
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1) indicates that total production of R&D is
independent of institutional structure.
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tal and labor changes proportionally. Third, the political-economic equilibrium is
indeterminate if institutions favor the consumption good producing sector. Pre-
cisely because unbiased institutions already suggest the labor augmenting path,
an additional and deliberate prejudice towards the same direction expectably cre-
ates indeterminacy. Lastly, for a given scal policy, wage-rental ratios remain
unchanged across di¤erent sectoral absorptions16. When compared across insti-
tutional arrangements, factor-price ratios are maximal (minimal) with unbiased
(biased) institutions 17. As stated earlier, labor-augmentation becomes a domi-
nant direction of technological change when institutions are unbiased, implying
that labor is scarce and therefore expensive. This is why producers of the labor-
intensive sector intensively lobby to obtain labor-augmenting R&D. It is expected
wages to decline once the labor-augmenting R&D is made available. Thus high
wages are to take place ex ante.
Growth and welfare in the lobbying economy. In the presence of unbiased insti-
16For instance, if the scal policy of (Lt > 
K
t ) is implemented then wage-rental ratio satises
!t(
L
t > 
K
t ; 
2 = 1; 2 = 1) = !t(
L
t > 
K
t ; 
2 = 1; 2 > 1) = !t(
L
t > 
K
t ; 
2 =
1; 2 < 1). This equality indicates that with unbised institutions wage-rental ratio will remain
unchanged regardles of the type of asymmetries. The same applies to biased institutions as well:
!t(
L
t > 
K
t ; 
2 > 1; 2 = 1) = !t(
L
t > 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t ; 
2 > 1; 2 > 1) = !t(
L
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K
t ; 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1; 2 <
1):
17!t(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K
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1)] wher !t(Lt >
Kt ; 
2 = 1) is the wage-rental ratio when institutions are unbiased and heavy labor income
tax imposed. The same ranking applies to biased institutional set up as well. The comparison
of rankings across institutions and across scal policies yields !t(Lt > 
K
t ; 
2 = 1) > !t(
L
t =
Kt ; 
2 = 1) > !t(
L
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L
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K
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1): The response of the wage-rental ratio to a change in institutional
structure can be derived from
!t = A
2ez
2(1;2)2(k2(1; 2))1 
2
where A2 

1 2
2

and z2(1; 2) = (1  22)

2s2tY
2
t
1s1tY
1
t+
2s2tY
2
t

. Taking the natural logarithm
of !t
ln!t = lnA
2 + 2z2(1; 2) + (1  2) ln k2(1; 2)
and then the derivative of the resulting function with respect to 2 yields
@ ln!t
@2
= 2
@z2(1; 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@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+ (1  2)@ ln k
2(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2
:
The fact that the closed forms for the partial derivatives on the right hand side of @ ln!t
@2
are not
known leaves us with numerical techniques.
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tutions, gross national product is maximized when the investment good producing
sector has higher technological capability and the government collects heavy labor
income taxes, Yt(Lt > 
K
t ; 
2 > 1; 2 = 1). When institutions favor the capital
intensive sector, national product increases, that is Yt;(Lt > 
K
t ; 
2 > 1; 2 >
1) > Yt(
L
t > 
K
t ; 
2 > 1; 2 = 1), implying a positive growth e¤ect. However,
welfare reaches its maximum level when (Lt < 
K
t ; 
2 < 1; 2 = 1), which looks
a little puzzling. What it implies, in fact, is that policies encouraging institu-
tional bias as well as increasing technological capabilities of the investment good
producing sector help correct the direction of technological change, and generate
growth at the expense of welfare gains. In the situation where welfare is maxi-
mized however, dynamic ine¢ ciency emerges due to the implementation of heavy
capital taxes K > L.
4. Concluding remarks
This study develops a two-sector overlapping generations model, supposing that
government is open to the inuence of producerscollective action. Remaining
within the connes of industrial policy arguments, the study draws attention to the
role that distortions in government and asymmetrical technology absorption might
play in the process of technological change. The goal is to provide a qualitative
assessment of the e¤ects of political lobbying on the direction of technical changes
and on welfare along with the implied direction. This is accomplished by analyzing
two scenarios. At one, sectors are not able to absorb the externalities from the
existing stock of technology; at the other scenario, they are assumed to have
asymmetric absorption capabilities.
Simulation results suggest that current generations are expected to experi-
ence welfare loss while a technologically advantageous environment is prepared
for future generations. The undistorted government supports the path of capital-
augmenting technological change, which is also the dominant path supported by
the distorted government, operating with institutions that deliberately favor the
investment good producing sector. This coincidence of the two paths implies a
cost for the imposition of a biased institutional structure. A second main result
is that sectoral asymmetries with respect to technology assimilation capabilities
do not help industries cope with weaknesses in the political market, and hence
do not help change the direction of technological developments. Finally, lobbying
leads to excess supply of R&D compared to the level supported by the undistorted
government, which further implies that consumers will have more tax burden in
16
the lobbying economy.
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6. Appendix
6.1. Producers
Given a vector of variables (wt; rt; pit; G
i
t; s
 i
t ; Y
 i
t ; Gt; Gt 1) > 0, a representative
rm in sector i solves the static prot maximization problem by choosing (Y it ; K
i
t ;
Lit; R
i
t)
18 :
Max
(Y it ;K
i
t ;L
i
t;R
i
t)
it = p
i
tY
i
t   wtLit   rtKit (6.1)
s:t: Y it = (1 Rit)Eit 1[i(Ai(Git)Kit)
i
+ (1  i)(Di(Git)Lit)
i
]
i
i
Git =
"
iRitY
i
tP2
i=1 
iRitY
i
t
#
Gt
0  Y it ; 0  Kit ; 0  Lit; 0  Rit  1 (6.2)
where Y it  (1   Rit)Y
i
t denotes the after-lobbying output of sector i at time t,
Kit capital, L
i
t labor, G
i
t public input employed by sector i, Gt aggregate public
R&D, Rit proportion of the output used in lobbying activities, 
i parameter of
institutional bias (or parameter of lobbying e¢ ciency), i parameter of capital-
intensity, i e¢ ciency parameter of the capital-augmenting R&D, i parameter of
returns to scale, i parameter of technology absorption capability (or parameter
of ability to make e¤ective use of technology), and i = ( 1
1 i ) the elasticity of
substitution between Kit and L
i
t. The terms A
i(Git) and D
i(Git) are the capital
and labor-augmentation functions, respectively. The relative price of output is
denoted by pt  (p
1
t
p2t
) where the investment good is taken as numeraire, (i.e.,
p2t  1); the wage-rental ratio by !t  (wtrt ) where wt and rt are rental rates of
labor and capital, respectively. An index
Eit 1 =

e
iGt 1 if i > 0 8i and
P2
i=1 
i = 1
1 if i = 0 8

is used to di¤erentiate between the two models: one with technology absorption,
the other one with no absorption. It is important to note that Git enters the
production function as a parameter rather than as a choice variable because its
value is determined at the political market where producers (namely, lobbyists)
and the distorted government interact.
18If i = 1, then  i = 2 or vice versa.
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6.2. Consumers
Given (wt; rt; pt; pt+1) > 0; (Kt ; 
L
t )  0; and t  0, a young person at time
t  1 chooses (ct(t); ct(t+ 1); St) to maximize his/her utility:
Max
(ct(t);ct(t+1);St)
Ut = ln ct(t) +  ln ct(t+ 1)
s:t: ptct(t) + St  wtL+ t
pt+1ct(t+ 1)  (1 + it+1)(1  Kt )St
0  ct(t); 0  ct(t+ 1); given L = 1: (6.3)
The elements of the vector (ct(t); ct(t + 1); St) represent time t and time (t + 1)
consumption of the person born at time t, and savings at time t, respectively. pt+1
denotes the expected relative price at time t of the consumption good in terms
of investment good. Savings at time t enable individuals to consume during the
second period of their lives. The gross return to savings (or capital) (1 + it+1)
is known at time t by both borrowers and lenders. E¤ective (or after-tax) wage
rate is dened as wt  (1   Lt )wt; the tax rates on labor and capital incomes
are denoted by Lt and 
K
t , respectively. The total prot distributed is equal to
t 
P2
i=1 
i
t.
The solution to (6.3) is (ct(t) =
(wt+t)
(1+)pt
; ct(t + 1) =
(1+it+1)(wt+t)
(1+)pt+1
; St =
(wt+t)
(1+)
). The indirect utility function then becomes
Vt(pt; pt+1; wt; it+1) = ln

(wt + t)
(1 + )pt

+  ln

(1 + it+1)(wt + t)
(1 + )pt+1

: (6.4)
At time t = 1, the initial old person born at t = 0 solves
Max
(c0(1);S0)
U0 =  ln c0(1)
s:t: p1c0(1)  (1 + i1)(1  K0 )S0
c0(1)  0; given S0 = K1 > 0 (6.5)
where r1 is e¤ective (or after-tax) rental rate of capital at t = 1; savings of
the old person are equal to the economy-wide capital stock at t = 1, that is,
S0 = K1. The indirect utility level of the initial old person becomes V0(p1; i1) =
 ln((1 + i1)(1  K0 )S0=p1).
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6.3. Distorted government
Given (wt; rt; pGt ; 
K
t ; 
L
t ), the distorted government chooses (Gt; K
G
t ; L
G
t ) to
maximize the value of the production of R&D:
Max
(Gt;KGt ;L
G
t )
WGt = p
G
t Gt
s:t: Gt = (K
G
t )
(LGt )
1 
Tt = wtL
G
t + rtK
G
t (6.6)
where the shadow price pGt represents the value to society of incremental unit
of R&D, in terms of the investment good. KGt =
Tt
rt
and LGt =
(1 )Tt
wt
are the
governments demand for capital and for labor, respectively. The equilibrium
provision of R&D is Gt = ( rt )
(1 
wt
)1 Tt where  stands for the share of capital
in Gt. The government collects capital and labor income taxes, Tt  Lt wtLt +
Kt rtKt.
Denition 1. (Political-economic equilibrium) Given (K0; L0) > 0, an allocation
fct(t); ct 1(t); St; Y it ; Kit ; Lit; Git; Rit; KGt ; LGt ; Gt; Gt 1 8i;tg is feasible if Rit 2
(0; 1], Y it = (1   Rit)Eit 1[i(Ai(Git)Kit)i + (1   i)(Di(Git)Lit)i ]
i
i for i = 1; 2,
Gt = (K
G
t )
(LGt )
1 , and Git = I
i
tGt: A political-economic equilibrium is a feasible
allocation with accompanying price system fwt; rt; pt; pGt g1t=1; a lobbying system
fRitg1t=1, and a tax scheme fKt ; Lt g1t=1 such that
 representative rms solve (6.2),
 consumers solve (6.3 and 6.5),
 distorted government solves (6.6),
 capital market satises Kt+1 = St for all t, and
 input and output markets clear: Kt =
P2
i=1 K
i
t + K
G
t ; Lt =
P2
i=1 L
i
t + L
G
t ;
Gt =
P2
i=1G
i
t; St = Y
2
t ; and ct(t) + ct 1(t) = Y
1
t .
A political-economic equilibrium is an interior solution to the following system
of equations. Given initial capital and labor endowments (K0; L0) > 0 and Ei0 = 1,
26
this system is solved for fY it ; Kit ; Lit; Git; Rit; i1t; i2t; ct(t); ct(t+ 1); St; t; t+1;
Gt; K
G
t ; L
G
t ; 1t; 2t; wt; rt; pt for 8i=1;2g:
@`i
@Y it
=  i1t + pit = 0; if Y it > 0 (6.7)
@`i
@Kit
= (1 Rit)Zite
iiGit(Kit)
 1+iii1t
i   rt = 0; if Kit > 0 (6.8)
@`i
@Lit
= (1 Rit)Zite
i(1 i)Git(Lit)
 1+i(1  i)i1ti   wt = 0; if Lit > 0 (6.9)
@`i
@Rit
= i2t
"
iY
i
tP2
i=1 
iRitY
i
t
  R
i
t(
iY
i
t)
2
(
P2
i=1 
iRitY
i
t)
2
#
  i1tY
i
t = 0; if R
i
t > 0 (6.10)
@`i
@i1t
= (1 Rit)Y
i
t   Y it = 0; if i1t > 0 (6.11)
@`i
@i2t
=
"
iRitY
i
tP2
i=1 
iRitY
i
t
#
  Cit = 0; if i2t > 0;where Cit  (
Git
Gt
) (6.12)
@`C
@ct(t)
=
1
ct(t)
  tpt = 0; if ct(t) > 0;where pt  (p
1
t
p2t
) (6.13)
@`C
@ct(t+ 1)
=

ct(t+ 1)
  t+1pt+1 = 0; if ct(t+ 1) > 0 (6.14)
@`C
@St
= t+1(1 + it+1)(1  Kt )  t = 0; if St > 0 (6.15)
@`C
@t
= t + Lwt   ptct(t)  St = 0; if t > 0 (6.16)
@`C
@t+1
= (1 + it+1)(1  Kt )St   pt+1ct(t+ 1) = 0; if t+1 > 0 (6.17)
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@`G
@Gt
= pGt   1t = 0; if Gt > 0 (6.18)
@`G
@KGt
= (kGt )
 1+1t   2trt = 0; if KGt > 0, where kGt  (
KGt
LGt
) (6.19)
@`G
@LGt
= (1  )(kGt )G1t   2twt = 0; if Lt > 0 (6.20)
@`G
@1t
= (kGt )
   gt = 0; if 1t > 0, where gt  (
Gt
LGt
) (6.21)
@`G
@2t
= Tt   (rtKGt + wtLGt ) = 0; if 2t > 0; (6.22)
Kt =
2X
i=1
Kit +K
G
t (6.23)
Lt =
2X
i=1
Lit + L
G
t (6.24)
Gt =
2X
i=1
Git (6.25)
Y 2t = St (6.26)
Y 1t = ct(t) + ct 1(t) (6.27)
where we denote for notational simplicity Zit 

Y
i
t
[i(Ai(Git)K
i
t)
i+(1 i)(Di(Git)Lit)i ]

and
Y
i
t  Eit 1[i(Ai(Git)Kit)i + (1   i)(Di(Git)Lit)i ]
i
i . There are 27 unknowns and
27 equations, implying the existence of a unique political-economic equilibrium.
Manipulations of equation (6.8, 6.9) yield
kit 

Kit
Lit

=
24 !t
1 i
i

eG
i
t(1 2i)i
35

1
1 i

= ki(!t; G
i
t):
Substitution of (6.12) into ki(!t; Git) results in k
i
t

!t;

iRitY
i
tP2
i=1 
iRitY
i
t

Gt

, indicating
that ki(:) is a function of

Kit
Lit

.
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6.4. Undistorted government
Given Ei0 = 1, the undistorted government chooses (Y
i
t ; K
i
t ; L
i
t; G
i
t; K
B
t ; L
B
t ; Gt
for i = 1; 2) to maximize gross national product, Yt:
Max
(Y it ;K
i
t ;L
i
t;G
i
t;K
B
t ;L
B
t ;Gt)
Yt =
1X
t=0
2X
i=1
pitY
i
t (6.28)
s:t: Y it = E
i
t 1[
i(e
iGitKit)
i + (1  i)(e(1 i)GitLit)
i
]
i
i ; for i = 1; 2
Gt = (K
B
t )
(LBt )
1 
Kt =
2X
i=1
Kit +K
B
t
Lt =
2X
i=1
Lit + L
B
t
Gt =
2X
i=1
Git:
The following system of equations is solved for fY it ; Kit ; Lit; Git; KBt ; LBt ; Gt; 'i1t
for i = 1; 2; and 'jt 8j=2;:::;5g where 'i1t and 'jt are the Lagrangian multipliers:
@`B
@Y 1t
= pt   '11t = 0; if Y 1t > 0; (6.29)
@`B
@Y 2t
= 1  '21t = 0; if Y 2t > 0; (6.30)
@`B
@Kit
= Zite
iiGit(Kit)
 1+iii'i1t   '2t = 0; if Kit > 0; (6.31)
@`B
@Lit
= Zite
i(1 i)Git(Lit)
 1+i(1  i)i'i1t   '3t = 0; ifLit > 0; (6.32)
@`B
@Git
=

'i1t
iZit

(1  i)(1  i)i  Di(Git)Liti + iii  Ai(Git)Kiti =i '4t
= 0; if Gi
t
> 0; (6.33)
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@`B
@Gt
= '4t   '5t = 0; if Gt > 0; (6.34)
@`B
@KBt
= '5t

LBt
KBt
1 
  '2t = 0; if KBt > 0; (6.35)
@`B
@LBt
= '5t(1  )

KBt
LBt

  '3t = 0; if LBt > 0; (6.36)
@`B
@'i1t
= Eit 1[
i(Ai(Git)K
i
t)
i +(1 i)(Di(Git)Lit)
i
]
i
i  Y it = 0; if 'i1t > 0; (6.37)
@`B
@'2t
= Kt  K1t  K2t  KBt = 0; if '2t > 0; (6.38)
@`B
@'3t
= Lt   L1t   L2t   LBt = 0; if '3t > 0; (6.39)
@`B
@'4t
= Gt  G1t  G2t = 0; if '4t > 0; (6.40)
@`B
@'5t
= (KBt )
(LBt )
1   Gt = 0; if '5t > 0: (6.41)
There are 18 unknowns and 18 equations, therefore there exists a unique solution.
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Figure 1.  Unbiased Institutions (f1=f2) and Technology Absorption (hi>0 for i=1,2)
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